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How have M&As Changed? Evidence from the Sixth Merger Wave 
 
1. Introduction 
Recent studies have examined the characteristics and success of M&As during the fifth 
merger cycle that started in 1993 and peaked in 2000 where over $1.4 trillion was spent on 
U.S. deals. This was marked by extensive overpayment, mega-deals, overvaluation of 
acquiring firms, prevalence of equity financing, and significant value destruction for 
acquiring firm shareholders (Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001; Dong, Hirshleifer, 
Richardson, and Teoh, 2006; and Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2005). The sixth merger 
wave emerged in 2003, only about three years after technology bubble burst and the end of 
the fifth merger cycle. M&A activity peaked in 2006 with more than $1 trillion spent on deals 
within the U.S. The new wave came to an end approximately in late-2007, when investors 
and corporate managers started showing real signs of skepticism about the state of the MBS 
and credit markets and their potential ripple effects on the financial system and the economy 
as a whole. As the crisis unfolded, credit tightened and financing became scarce, bringing 
deals to a halt. The general macro-, micro-economic, corporate governance and capital 
market environment significantly evolved during and following the recession stage that 
ensued the fifth merger cycle. Moreover, important lessons were learned from the fifth 
merger wave that may have resulted in improvements in the quality of acquisition decisions.  
In this paper we examine whether the characteristics and success of deals that took place 
during the sixth merger wave diverge from the previous experience.  
It appears that behavioral theories according to which merger waves are more likely 
to occur as a result of overvalued firms seeking to acquire less overvalued assets (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 2003 and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004) are unlikely to explain the 
sixth merger cycle. It is conventionally believed that the thriving stock prices amid this wave 
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were based more on sound fundamentals, rather than over-optimistic expectations. The mean 
monthly inflation adjusted P/E ratio for S&P500 was about 39 during 1998-1999 while less 
than 26 between 2005 and 2006.
1
 Accordingly, we find that during the sixth merger wave 
acquirers‟ assets were less highly valued and the valuation diversity between acquirers and 
targets was narrower relative to the 1990s wave.
2
 Moreover, the post millenium era is 
characterized by lower U.S. corporate loan prime rates and stronger cash balances for 
acquirers, resulting in more debt and free cash financing of merger deals respectively. It is 
therefore more likely that the sixth merger wave was mainly propagated by the availability of 
abundant liquidity, in the spirit of Harford‟s (2005) neoclassical explanation. Both, access to 
cash (Martin, 1996) and firm valuations (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) have been associated 
with the choice of the method of payment and can explain why a much smaller fraction of 
deals was financed with stock as opposed to the 1990s paradigm. The proportion of stock-
swap financed acquisitions dropped by more than 57% while the overall amount of equity in 
the financing decreased by about 32%. In contrast, both the purely cash financed transactions 
as well as the cash element in acquisition offers increased to levels last observed in the 
1980s.
3
 
Further, it is possible that the bullish managerial and investor sentiment during the 
fifth merger wave led to record levels of merger activity and regular “control contests” that 
made acquirers bid more aggressively and, as a result, be prone to overpayment. If managers 
have learned from this experience, then hubris or empire building motivated acquisition 
decisions should be less frequent during the sixth merger cycle and competition for listed 
                                               
1  Data are from Bob Shiller‟s Web site (www.irrationalexuberance.com/index.htm). 
2 Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2005) and Dong et al. (2006) find that acquirers were more 
overvalued than targets in the 1980s and 1990s.  
3 Shleifer and Vishny (1991) report that acquisitions during the 4th merger wave were more frequently financed 
with cash . Andrade, Mitchel and Staford (2001) find that the fraction of cash financed deals during the 1980s 
was about 45%. Availability of liquidity is cited among the drivers of the 4th merger cycle that also include 
relaxation of regulatory restrictions that led to an increase in hostile deals and bust-up takeovers as well as a 
plethora of LBOs.  
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targets should be less intense. We show that the market for corporate control was by 55.1% 
(16.4%) less competitive in 2003-2007 compared to 1993-1999 based on the value (number) 
of listed firms being targeted in successful deals. Acquisitions by frequent acquirers, that 
have been associated with managerial hubris (Billett and Qian, 2008), were also by 35% less 
common during the sixth merger wave. A CEO overconfidence measure based on the timing 
of option exercise following Malmendier and Tate (2008) also reflects lower levels of 
managerial overconfidence. Given that premiums increase with takeover competition 
(Fishman, 1988; and Alexandridis, Petmezas, and Travlos, 2010) and managerial over-
optimism (Roll, 1986), we should expect that acquirers offered less generous premiums 
during the sixth merger wave. Moreover, Starks and Wei (2004) and Wang and Xie (2009) 
show that the quality of corporate governance of the acquirer is negatively associated with the 
offer premium. Therefore, premiums may have also decreased due to the corporate 
governance improvements brought forward by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the second half of 
2002. Along these lines, we find that the average premium paid in public acquisitions during 
the sixth merger cycle was 37.9% compared to 45.0% during the 1993-1999 period.
4
 This 
divergence in premiums is statistically significant and robust to different premium measures 
used, while it is not driven by any particular industries or other deal and firm characteristics.  
These findings lead to another main conjecture; that, all else equal, acquirers should 
have been able to retain more of the potential benefit from deals and create more value for 
their shareholders. In an efficient market, we would therefore expect that investors perceive 
public acquisition announcements more favorably than in the past.
5
 Our evidence suggests 
that this is in fact not the case. Acquirers continued to realize significant losses around 
acquisition announcements, similar or worse in magnitude to the previous experience. More 
                                               
4 Officer (2003) reports that acquirers paid on average premiums of 55% in public acquisitions between 1988 
and 2000. 
5 Along these lines, McKinsey & Co reports that during the latest M&A cycle (up to 2006) acquirers have been 
more disciplined about creating value for their shareholders (Dobbs et al., 2007). 
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specifically, cash financed deals that took place in 2003-2007 did not create value for 
acquiring firms shareholders, in contrast to the 1990s, while stock-swap transactions 
continued to result in extensive losses. The fact that cash financed acquisitions destroyed 
more value during the sixth merger wave may be explained by the fact that cash paying 
acquirers had much stronger cash reserves and excess cash balances can exacerbate the free 
cash flow problem (Jensen, 1986) and lead to value destroying acquisition decisions 
(Harford, 1999).  Results based on long-run stock performance corroborate that acquirers did 
not create more shareholder value during the sixth merger wave.  Target firms experienced 
similar or in some cases worse abnormal returns, which can be attributed to the inferior 
premiums offered. Consequently, acquisitions during the sixth merger wave were not 
associated with superior combined gains.  
Our work offers important contributions. First, we present new evidence on the sixth 
merger wave. We show this is not driven by overvaluation motives since acquiring firms i) 
are less, if at all, overvalued, ii) buy targets subject to similar valuations to their own, iii) 
finance their acquisitions with stock-swaps infrequently. Instead, it appears that liquidity, a 
fundamental element of more neoclassical theories, can help propagate merger waves. Of 
course this does not invalidate “behavioral” theories but rather corroborates that it does not 
take misvalued markets or firms for merger activity to thrive. Second, we show that control 
premia have decreased through time and are significantly lower during the sixth merger 
wave. On the one hand, this can imply more cautious and rational acquisition decisions and 
possibly an improved acquisition process as a whole where acquirers seek to retain more of 
the synergy gains for their shareholders. However, the finding that acquirers continued to 
destroy value for their shareholders, and in some cases in fact destroyed more value than in 
the past, attests that the payment of lower premiums is not sufficient to warrant value 
creation. A potential explanation for the lower returns in the sixth merger cycle is based on 
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investor sentiment. Rosen (2006) finds evidence that short-run abnormal returns to acquirers 
are higher during periods preceded by more investor over-optimism. Accordingly, Bouwman 
et al. (2009) report a positive relation between market valuations and short-run acquirer 
gains. Our tests show that i) market returns prior to deals in the 5
th
 merger wave are 
significantly higher than preceding deals that took place during the 6
th
 wave and ii) while 
both merger waves are classified as “high valuation” periods, still, inflation adjusted market 
P/E ratios are significantly higher during the fifth merger wave. Both these findings suggest 
that investor sentiment thrived during the fifth merger wave which may explain why returns 
to acquirers were on average less negative. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data and 
methodology used in our investigation and discusses the sample statistics. Section III 
evaluates and compares acquisition premiums and shareholder gains of the two most recent 
merger waves. Finally section IV provides concluding remarks.   
 
2. Data, Statistics, and Methodology 
The sample of acquisition announcements is from SDC and includes U.S., domestic, 
completed deals that took place between 1993 and 2007. For the initial analysis related to the 
identification of the merger waves both the acquirer and target firm can be either public, 
private or subsidiary, as classified by SDC. Figure 1 shows the dollar value spent in all deals 
through time. The fifth merger wave started developing in 1993 where the total deal value 
surged by more than 70% from the one year earlier and then continued building-up until 
1998.
6
 The market for corporate control remained highly active in 1999 and 2000 where more 
than $1.3 and $1.4 trillion respectively was spent on M&As. The total transaction value 
plummeted by 55% in 2001 and a further 39% in 2002. The sixth merger wave started in 
                                               
6 The unreported total deal value for 1992 was $160 billion.  
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2003, with an increase in the total value spent of almost 30%, and peaked in 2006, where the 
value reached $1.13 trillion, before significantly dropping in late 2007.  
 
[Please Insert Figure 1 About Here] 
 
Goel and Thakor (2010) use a de-trended market P/E ratio measure as in Bouwman et 
al. (2009) to identify merger waves.
7
 Based on this measure the great majority of months 
between 1993-1999 and 2003-2007 are classified as merger wave months. In contrast, all 
months within the 2000-2002 period are not classified as merger wave months. We also 
follow Harford‟s (2005) methodology to identify 24-month merger wave peaks. We first 
classify potential merger wave periods at the aggregate level by taking the highest 24-month 
merger bid concentration in each of the periods 1993-2000 and 2001-2007. We then perform 
1000 simulations that randomly assign each merger bid to a month within the corresponding 
period. If concentration in the actual 24-month period is higher than 95% of the simulation 
based 24-month highest concentrations, then this period is classified as a merger wave peak. 
This method suggests that two merger wave peaks occurred in 1998-1999 and 2005-2006. 
Performing the analysis at the industry level, based on a modified Fama and French 6-sector 
classification, verifies that there was a wave peak for all six industries around the same 
periods.
8
  
As most of our analysis focuses on relative valuations, acquisition gains and 
premiums we concentrate on public acquisitions that comprise the majority of the total value 
                                               
7A month is classified as merger-wave month if its de-trended market P/E was above the average market P/E 
over the past five-years.  
8 We modify the 5-industry classification from Kenneth French‟s website (Consumer, Manufacturing, HiTec, 
Healthcare, Other) by adding an additional category of “Financials” (SIC codes 6000-6999) which was 
originally included within “Other”. 
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spent on all M&As.
9
 We select transactions where the acquirer owns less than 10% of the 
target‟s shares prior to the acquisition proposal and more than 50% after the completion of 
the deal, the transaction value is at least $1 million and the size of the target is at least 1% of 
the size of the acquirer.
 
Acquiring firms are listed on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ and have 
data on CRSP and COMPUSTAT. Clustered acquisitions, where the acquirer is involved in 
more than one acquisition proposals within a three day window are omitted from the 
analysis.
10
 Our final sample consists of 3,206 transactions.  
 Table 1 reports the sample statistics. Deals are partitioned according to the following 
periods; 1993-1999 (fifth merger wave), 1998-1999 (fifth wave peak), 2000-2002 (recession), 
2003-2007 (sixth merger wave) and 2005-2006 (sixth wave peak). Market capitalization is 
measured one month prior to the acquisition announcement and is reported in 2007 dollars. 
Acquirers and targets are generally larger in the sixth merger wave compared to the 1990s but 
there are no significant variations in the target-to-acquirer relative size across the different 
periods. Firm overvaluation is measured by Tobin‟s Q (Jensen, 2005; Moeller et al., 2005) 
which is the market value of assets over the book value of assets.
11
 Based on this measure, 
acquirers are markedly more overvalued during the fifth merger wave relative to the sixth. 
More importantly, it appears that acquirers are in general more highly valued than targets 
during the fifth merger wave but this is not the case in 2003-2007. As a result, the acquirer-
to-target relative overvaluation variable (RELQ) is significantly lower during the sixth 
merger wave.
12
 The evidence here suggests it is unlikely that the sixth merger wave was 
                                               
9 However, where appropriate, we also examine in unreported tests whether our results are similar for deals by 
private acquirers or where the target is unlisted and find consistent patterns in most of the cases.  
10 Including clustered acquisitions however does not materially affect our results. 
11 Market value of assets is the book value of total assets minus the book value of common equity plus the 
market value of common equity. Alternatively, Tobin‟s Q can proxy for growth opportunities (Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling, 1989; Malmendier and Tate, 2008) and management effectiveness (Servaes, 1991; Lang, Stulz, and 
Walkling, 1989). Nonetheless, results are similar when we use the market-to-book ratio instead of the Tobin‟s 
Q.  
12 This could potentially imply less scope for value creation through M&As during the sixth merger wave. 
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initiated as a result of overvalued firms seeking to acquire less overvalued assets (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 2003). 
 
[Please Insert Table 1 About Here] 
 
Along these lines, Shleifer and Vishny argue that acquisitions driven by overvaluation 
are more likely paid for with stock-swaps. Both the stock financed transactions and the 
percentage of equity financing dropped dramatically during the sixth merger cycle. From a 
58.06% high during the fifth merger wave, stock financed transactions in 2003-2007 account 
for only 24.65%; a drop in stock financing of approximately 58%. The portion of equity in 
deals also decreased by nearly 32%. Conversely, both cash financed deals and the element of 
cash in acquisition offers doubled during the sixth merger wave. This financing pattern may 
have also been the result of lower interest rates and the record high corporate cash balances 
during this period, leading to more debt and free cash flow financing respectively. The yearly 
average of the Wall Street Journal‟s prime rate for the 2003-2007 (2005-2006) period is 
6.14% (7.07%) compared to 7.84% (8.18%) for 1993-1999 (1998-1999). As a result, in the 
sixth merger wave acquirers have higher industry adjusted debt-to-assets ratios at the fiscal 
year end following the acquisition announcement year.  Moreover, acquirers‟ assets-adjusted 
cash balances are also higher than in the 1990s, implying more ample idiosyncratic 
liquidity.
13
    
Although the 2003-2007 period is characterized by heightened merger activity, the 
market for corporate control for listed companies was less competitive than previously. 
Competition is measured by the ratio of the number of listed firms acquired to the number of 
                                               
13 Using sales-adjusted cash reserves produces similar results.  
10 
 
all CRSP firms each year.
14
 We also use the value of all listed firms acquired as a percentage 
of the market value of all CRSP firms. The fraction of U.S. listed firms targeted in completed 
deals decreased by over 16% during the most recent merger wave compared to the 1993-
1999. The share of the value of all listed firms acquired in M&A deals dropped from 3.96% 
(5.56%) in 1993-1999 (1998-1999) to 1.78% (2.31%) in 2003-2007 (2005-2006).  Acquirers 
were also less acquisitive during the sixth merger wave and acquisitiveness has been 
associated with managerial hubris (Malmendier and Tate, 2008 and Billett and Qian, 2008). 
More than 38% of all acquisitions in the sample are made by acquirers involved in two or 
more deals within a two year period.
15
 This share is 42.78% for 1993-1999 but only 28.12% 
for 2003-2007 which may suggest that acquisition decisions during the sixth merger wave 
were to a lesser extent driven by managerial over-optimism. We further examine variations in 
the likelihood of managerial hubris driven acquisition decisions between the two waves by 
using a measure based on in-the-money unexercised exercisable options held by the 
acquirer‟s CEO following Malmendier and Tate (2008). We estimate Holder67 which 
captures the timing of CEO options exercises. A CEO is classified as overconfident if he fails 
to exercise her stock options although they are 67% in-the-money.
16
 Our results again 
indicate that hubris infected acquirers were less frequent during the sixth merger wave and 
therefore acquisition decisions are less likely to be motivated my managerial over-optimism. 
We also capture investor sentiment by using the pre-announcement 6-month buy-and-hold 
return of the S&P 500. This „momentum‟ indicator is used in Rosen (2006). Market 
momentum is significantly less pronounced for transactions that took place during the sixth 
merger wave. 
                                               
14 A similar measure is used by Alexandridis et al. (2010) to proxy for competition at the country level. A more 
extensive sample is used for the construction of the competition measure that is based on the number of all listed 
firms acquired irrespective of the acquiring firm‟s public status. Using a measure based only on public 
acquisitions produces similar results.    
15 Our results are similar when using a five year window as in Billett and Qian (2008) or other alternative 
specifications.  
16 Executive options data is manually collected from DEF 14A proxy statements in SEC filings. 
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We use two measures of acquisition premium. The first is the offer price over the 
target‟s share price four weeks prior to the acquisition announcement and is reported for 
observations between zero and two as in Officer (2003).
17
 The second is the market adjusted 
target return for a 190 day window starting 63 days preceding the acquisition announcement, 
as in Schwert (2000).
18
 Figure 2 depicts acquisition premiums and indicates that they have 
decreased through time and were unusually low during the sixth merger cycle. Table 1 shows 
that acquiring firms paid on average a premium of almost 45% during the fifth merger wave 
and 48% during the 1998-1999 peak but less than 38% during 2003-2007 and 2005-2006. 
Accordingly, the premium paid for listed targets during the sixth merger cycle (2005-2006) 
was on average 15.8% (25.2%), substantially lower than during 1993-1999 (1998-1999). 
Premium differentials between the two waves and their peaks are statistically significant at 
the 1% level for both mean and median estimates and irrespective of the measure used.
19
  
 
[Please Insert Figure 2 About Here] 
 
For the return analysis we compute abnormal returns of acquiring and target firms 
using market model returns where parameters are estimated over the period (-250,-15) 
relative to the announcement day.
20
 The benchmark index used is the CRSP value-weighted 
index.
21
 Abnormal returns are then cumulated over the three- or 21-day period surrounding 
the acquisition announcement and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Total acquisition 
gains are calculated using the market value-weighted average of the acquirer and target 
                                               
17 For robustness we also use the ratio of the offer price to the 30-day (-45,-15) volume-weighted average of the 
target‟s trading price as a premium measure and our results remain very similar.  
18 Although for brevity we do not report results based on this measure in all tables, they are always very similar 
to using the first measure.  
19 Acquisition premium differentials are also statistically significant for all payment methods.  
20 Alternatively, using a market-adjusted model where α=0 and β=1 does not materially affect our results.  
21 The minimum estimation window is set to 30 days. Equally weighted benchmark returns or alternative 
estimation windows produce very similar results.  
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abnormal returns, where market values are measured one month prior to the acquisition 
announcement. 
For the long-run analysis we calculate acquirer performance using average calendar-
time abnormal returns (ACTARs) to control for the cross sectional dependence of stock 
returns. Acquirers enter the portfolio at the announcement month and remain for 36 months. 
Abnormal returns are calculated as follows: 
CTARi,t = Ri,t – RSize/BM benchmark,t 
where Ri,t is the return of acquirer i at month t and  RSize/BM benchmark,t  is the return of the 
corresponding 25 size and book-to-market equity (BE/ME) reference portfolio for the same 
month as in Mitchell and Stafford (2000). The ACTAR is then given by the universal average 
of all mean monthly abnormal return observations.  
We also estimate monthly abnormal returns for a period of 3-years following the 
acquisition announcement using calendar time portfolio regressions (CTPRs) of the following 
form: 
Rpt – Rft = p + bp (Rmt - Rft) + sp SMBt + hp HMLt + up UMDt + pt
 
  , 
where Rpt – Rft  is the equally-weighted, monthly calendar time portfolio excess return and the 
independent variables are the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factors. Calendar 
months with less than 10 return observations are excluded from regressions.  
 
3.2 Acquisition Premiums by Industry Sector 
 If premiums vary by industry and the two waves we examine are characterized by 
consolidation in different industries, then results may be driven by some particular sectors. If 
more “irrational” premiums were paid for instance for high-growth companies during the 
fifth merger wave, then the premium effect we document may be more pronounced for High-
Tech firms or may be even driven entirely by this sector.  
13 
 
 
[Please Insert Table 2 About Here] 
 
 Table 2 reports acquisition premiums by time period and target industry. We use the 
Fama and French five industry classification to partition targets into sector groups but report 
results for financials separately.
22
 No great variation is observed in terms of what type of 
firms were acquired during the two waves. Acquisitions involving targets in the 
manufacturing and consumer sectors represent a smaller segment of the sixth merger wave 
compared to the 1993-1999 period. In contrast, there was an increase in acquisitions of firms 
within „Healthcare‟ and „Financials‟. The highest premiums over the sample period are paid 
for Hi-Tech targets (52.27%), followed by „Other‟ and „Consumer‟ sectors where the mean 
premium is 49.77% and 49.10% respectively. On the other hand, the lowest premiums are 
paid for financial firms (38.17%). In general, premiums are lower in 2003-2007 compared to 
1993-1999 irrespective of the target sector. Differentials between the most recent merger 
wave and the fifth merger wave are negative and statistically significant at conventional 
levels for most sectors. The divergence in premiums is more pronounced in the 
„Manufacturing‟ and „HiTec‟ sectors and less intense in the „Consumer‟ and „Other‟ sectors, 
where however the number of observations is relatively small. Overall, it appears that the 
premium differences we document is not driven by any particular industry but is rather a 
ubiquitous phenomenon.
23
   
 
                                               
22 Fama and French group financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) in the “Other” sector subset that also includes firms 
in the mining, construction, construction material, transportation, hotel, business service, and entertainment 
sectors. We also partition targets based on 12 and 17 industries according to Fama and French but do not report 
the results as the number of observations is particularly low for several period-sector sub-sets and this impacts 
statistical significance. It appears however that premiums during the sixth merger wave are still lower for 11 out 
of 12 cases and 14 out of 17 cases respectively. In addition, premium differentials between the two merger wave 
periods remain similar both in terms of direction and significance when we exclude Hi-Tech firms.   
 
14 
 
3.3 Acquisition Abnormal Returns 
The fact that acquirers pay lower premiums during the sixth merger wave implies that, 
all else equal, they should have been able to retain more of the potential benefit from deals 
and create more value for their shareholders.
24
 We would therefore expect that investors react 
more favorably to public acquisition announcements. On the other hand, given the lower 
premiums, target shareholders should benefit less. Table 3 reports abnormal returns for three- 
and 21-day windows around the acquisition announcement for acquirers and targets, as well 
as synergy gains. Results are partitioned by time period and method of payment.  
 
[Please Insert Table 3 About Here] 
 
Panel A reports acquirer returns. Overall, public acquisitions result in a 1.50% 
abnormal loss for acquiring firms in the three-day window surrounding the acquisition 
announcement which is statistically significant at the 1% level. This is consistent with prior 
evidence that public acquisitions fail to create value for acquirers.
25
 The documented value 
loss can be attributed to the stock and hybrid payment subsets that result in abnormal returns 
of -2.43% and -1.55%, respectively. Conversely, acquisitions paid for with cash are 
associated with small but positive abnormal returns. Despite the lower premiums, 
shareholders of acquiring companies did not earn better returns during the sixth merger wave 
relative to the fifth.  In fact, acquirers that paid with cash created less value, reflected in the 
negative and statistically significant return differences between 2003-2007 and 1993-1999. 
This result may be associated with richer cash balances and availability of abundant liquidity 
in general during the sixth merger wave. Excess cash can exacerbate the free-cash flow 
                                               
24 This requires that the expected synergy gains from acquisitions are comparable.  
25 See for example, Firth (1980), Asquith (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983), and Travlos (1987), Andrade, 
Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002), Moeller et al. (2004), and Faccio, 
McConnell, and Stolin (2006). In unreported results we also establish that acquirer returns are also not 
statistically different between the two merger waves for deals where the target is unlisted. 
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problem and lead to worse managerial decisions (Jensen, 1986; Harford, 1999). Moreover, 
acquirers have accumulated more debt in their balance sheets during the 6
th
 merger wave and 
raising more debt to pay for acquisitions can be a negative signal for investors.    
There is some evidence that stock financed deals also destroyed more value for 
acquirer shareholders during the sixth merger wave, although results for the 21-day window 
do not confirm this. In general, it appears that returns to acquirers that finance acquisitions 
with equity or mixed payments remain in most cases negative and have not improved during 
the sixth merger wave.    
A general explanation why mergers do not create more value during the sixth merger 
wave is based on investor sentiment. Rosen (2006) finds evidence that short-run abnormal 
returns to acquirers are higher during periods preceded by more investor over-optimism and 
Bouwman et al. (2009) report a positive relation between market valuations and short-run 
acquirer gains. Table 1 shows that „market momentum‟ prior to deals in the 5th merger wave 
is more pronounced than prior to deals that took place during the 6
th
 wave. Moreover, while 
both merger waves are classified as “high valuation” periods, still, inflation adjusted market 
P/E ratios are significantly higher during the fifth merger wave. The thriving investor 
sentiment during the fifth merger wave can therefore explain why returns to acquirers were 
less negative for this period.  
Panel B reports target announcement returns. On average, targets experience 
abnormal returns of 19.47%, significant at the 1% level for a three-day window around the 
offer announcement. Gains are higher in cash deals (27.69%) compared to stock (16.42%) 
and hybrid (18.43%) deals, although premiums for the three payment type subsets are similar. 
This may be because target resistance is less common and the likelihood of success lower in 
stock offers (Fishman, 1989; Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993).  There is no evidence that target 
returns were lower during 2003-2007 based on the three-day window. For the 21-day window 
16 
 
abnormal returns to target firms are higher for all subsets and also the differences between 
gains in the 2003-2007 period and the 1990s wave (or their peaks) are statistically significant 
in several cases. This is consistent with the evidence that the premiums paid were lower 
during the most recent merger wave.  
If acquisitions did not create more value for both acquirer and target firm shareholders 
then overall acquisition gains should also not be expected to have increased after 2002. Panel 
C reports synergy gains calculated using the market value weighted average of the acquirer 
and target abnormal returns. Synergistic gains are positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level irrespective of the return window used. However, acquisitions during the sixth 
merger wave created less value when cash payments were involved which clearly driven by 
acquirer gains for the all-cash subset (Panel A). There is no clear evidence of significant 
differences in combined gains from acquisitions between periods for the rest of the subsets. 
All in all, acquisitions during the sixth merger cycle fail to create superior value for their 
shareholders as well as synergy gains.  
 
3.4 Acquirer Winners and Losers 
In the previous section we established that investors did not perceive public 
acquisition announcements more favorably during the sixth merger wave compared to the 
1990s. Mean and median returns to acquirers however do not accurately reflect the actual 
distribution of winners and losers that may convey additional information about value 
creation or destruction. Table 4 therefore reports the share of winners and losers as well as 
extreme winners and losers around the acquisition announcement within each period and 
payment method subset. Winners (Losers) are acquirers subject to positive (negative) 
17 
 
abnormal returns. Extreme winners (losers) are acquirers that experience abnormal returns 
above (below) the median value of the positive (negative) return sub-set of the total sample.
26
  
 
[Please Insert Table 4 About Here] 
 
For the entire sample, there are more losers (60.2%) than winners (39.8%). Each of 
these subsets is equally split into „moderate‟ and „extreme‟ winners and losers. 53.3% 
(46.7%) of the acquirers that paid with cash and 34.9% (65.1%) of those that exchanged their 
stock experienced positive (negative) abnormal returns. Within the winner-cash (loser-cash 
group) group 49.9% (only 30.5%) are extreme winners (losers) and within the winner-stock 
(loser-stock) group 48.4% (55.7%) are extreme winners (losers). There are more extreme 
losers in the stock subset relative to the cash subset. 
We observe significant differences in the distribution of winners and losers between 
the two merger waves. For instance, the percentage of winners (losers) has significantly 
decreased (increased) during the sixth merger wave. This may explain the fact that acquirers 
do not, on average, create more value for shareholders during this wave. In addition, in the 
fifth merger wave and during its peak in the end of the 1990s extreme winners and losers 
comprise a larger share than moderate winners and losers in all but the cash subset. 
Conversely, there was more pronounced concentration in the moderate subsets during the 
sixth merger wave and its peak. Difference tests show that the decrease (increase) in the share 
of extreme (moderate) winners in sixth merger wave, relative to the 1990s, is more 
pronounced for the cash sub-sample. On the other hand, the stake of extreme (moderate) 
losers decreased (increased) notably but differences are driven by the hybrid subset.  
                                               
26 The median abnormal return for the winner (loser) subset is 2.6% (-3.6%).  
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In general, acquirers experienced extreme abnormal returns less often during the sixth 
merger wave irrespective of the method of payment used. This could reflect more efficient 
investor reaction to acquisition announcements during this wave. Overall, the share of 
winners did not increase while the share of extreme winners shrank, suggesting that there 
were actually fewer acquirers that created (or were expected to create) superior value for their 
shareholders during the sixth merger cycle.  
 
3.5 Multivariate Analysis 
In this section we perform multivariate tests to examine whether acquisition 
premiums and returns are systematically related to the time period examined after controlling 
for other firm and deal characteristics that may drive the results. 
Table 5 reports regression estimates where the dependent variable is the acquisition 
premium.
27
 The main explanatory variable is a dummy that takes the value of one if the 
acquisition announcement takes place within 2003-2007 and zero otherwise. In some 
specifications a 2005-2006 dummy is used instead. We also include control variables that 
have been found to be associated with acquisition premiums. Alexandridis et al. (2010) show 
that premiums increase with competition in the market for corporate control. We include in 
our regressions a dummy variable (BID) that takes the value of one when there is one or more 
competing acquirers for the same target and zero otherwise.
28
  Premiums are also higher in 
tender offers (Kohers, Kohers, and Kohers, 2007) and hostile offers (Schwert, 2000). We 
therefore use two controls for tender offers (TEND) and hostility (HOST). The indicator 
variable SERIAL controls for the presence of frequent acquirers that have been associated 
                                               
27 Premium is defined as the ratio of the offer price to the stock price of the target four weeks prior to the 
acquisition announcement.  Results remain similar when using a premium measure based on target returns as in 
Schwert (2000). 
28 We have also run the regressions using the alternative corporate control competition variables reported in 
Table 1 or a “liquidity index” as in Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (2002). The sign and the significance of 
these variables however remain similar to the variable BID.  
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with managerial overoptimism (Billett and Qian, 2008) and, as a result, overpayment (Roll, 
1986). Officer (2003) finds that acquirers pay less for financial firms. Our results in Table 2 
corroborate this and also show that Hi-Tech targets receive the heftiest premiums. 
Accordingly, we add two binary variables for the occurrence of acquisitions involving 
technology (TECH) and financial (FIN) targets. We also include an inter-industry dummy 
(INTER) that takes the value of one when the target and the acquirer have a different 2-digit 
SIC code. Nathan and O‟Keefe (1989) find that premiums are negatively related to the 
business cycle. The market run-up variable (RUNUP), defined as the 6-month Buy-and-Hold 
return of the S&P 500 index, starting seven months prior to the acquisition announcement, 
controls for this effect. Huang and Walkling (1987) find that premiums are higher in cash 
compared to stock acquisitions to compensate target shareholders for the immediate tax 
implications. Moeller et al. (2004) however document a negative relation between the 
occurrence of a cash offer and the premium paid. It is therefore possible that target 
shareholders require higher premiums in stock exchange offers to compensate them for the 
loss they are likely to incur from the well documented depreciation in the value of the 
acquirer in this case (Travlos, 1987). We thus include a dummy equal to one for stock swaps 
(STOCK) and zero otherwise. Moeller et al. (2004) also report that large acquirers (targets) 
pay (receive) higher premiums. We therefore control for acquirer (ASIZE) and target (TSIZE) 
size using the natural logarithms of their market capitalization one month prior to the 
acquisition announcement. Finally, Dong et al. (2006) show that relative acquirer and target 
valuations can affect the offer premium. We use the relative acquirer-to-target Tobin‟s Q 
(RELQ) to control for this effect.  
We run the regressions i) for the entire sample, ii) only for the periods that comprise 
the two merger waves, and iii) the peak of the sixth merger wave and the peak of the fifth 
merger wave. We also present results for two specifications in each case as including the 
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relative Q in the regressions significantly reduces our sample. In Regressions (1) and (2) the 
coefficient of the „2003-2007‟ dummy is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level 
corroborating that acquirers paid less for targets in the sixth merger wave. The sign and 
significance of most of the explanatory variables are in most cases according to the 
predictions of previous studies (Officer, 2003; Moeller et al., 2004; and Wang and Xie, 
2009). All variables together explain 14.00% and 17.10% of the cross-sectional variation in 
premiums in specifications (1) and (2), respectively.  
 
[Please Insert Table 5 About Here] 
 
In regressions (3) to (6) we examine differences in premiums between the two merger 
waves and their peaks. We therefore include only 1993-1999 and 2003-2007 observations in 
specifications (3) and (4) and only 1998-1999 and 2005-2006 observations in specifications 
(5) and (6). Both wave dummies remain negative and statistically significant at the 1% level 
in all cases. The premiums paid during the sixth merger wave are almost nine percentage 
points smaller in absolute terms. Premiums are also 13% lower during the 2005-2006 peak 
relative to 1998-1999. The sign and significance of the other explanatory variables are similar 
to regressions (1) and (2).  
 
[Please Insert Table 6 About Here] 
 
Table 6 presents regression estimates where the dependent variable is the 3-day CAR 
to acquiring firms.
29
 Explanatory variables are similar as in premium regressions. Asquith et 
al. (1983), Travlos (1987), and Moeller et al. (2004) document a negative relation between 
                                               
29 Results remain similar when we use a 5-, 11-, or 21-day CAR window. 
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acquirer returns and the target-to-bidder relative size. Hence, we replace target size with 
relative size (RSIZE). We also include the offer premium (PREM) as an explanatory variable. 
The coefficients of the „2003-2007‟ and „2005-2006‟ dummies are statistically insignificant 
in most specifications suggesting that acquirers did not create more value for their 
shareholders during the sixth merger wave. In fact the negative coefficient of „2003-2007‟ in 
specification 3 statistically significant pointing to greater losses compared to the fifth merger 
wave. Table 7 presents the estimates of the combined CARs regressions. Overall, regression 
results suggest that there is no statistically significant difference in acquisition gains between 
the sixth merger cycle and the 1990s wave.  
[Please Insert Table 7 About Here] 
3.6 Large Loss Deals 
 Moeller et al. (2005) show that the extensive value destruction of M&A deals during 
the fifth merger wave was primarily the result of few “large-loss” deals that represent a small 
part of their sample. In this section we examine whether results for the sixth merger wave are 
also driven by large loss deals and how the corresponding losses compare to the ones 
documented for the fifth merger wave.  
Table 8 reports actual dollar gains/losses, cumulative abnormal returns and some 
other characteristics for large loss (Panel A) and non-large loss (Panel B) deals for each 
wave/period. Large loss are deals that result in at least $1bil losses (in 2007 dollars) for 
acquiring firms in the 3-day window surrounding the acquisition announcement.  Only about 
5% of all transactions are large-loss deals. There is no significant difference between the two 
waves in terms of the distribution of large loss deals. As a fraction of total deals more large 
loss deals took place during the 2000-2002 period where the markets were crashing but the 
weight of these deals is comparable for the two waves.  While mean dollar losses are also 
similar across the two waves, the negative abnormal returns to acquirers in larger loss deals 
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are less pronounced for the sixth merger cycle. On the other hand there is some evidence that, 
on average, non-large loss deals result in greater losses during this wave. This implies that the 
lower (or at least not higher) acquirer returns during the sixth merger wave cannot be 
attributed to large loss deals.
30
  
 
[Please Insert Table 8 About Here] 
 
3.7 Acquirer Long-Run Returns 
 Announcement window returns may reflect the initial perception of investors at the 
acquisition announcement but not actual value creation. We therefore examine whether 
acquirers that made acquisitions in the sixth merger wave benefit more in the long-run. In an 
efficient market with rational investors, and given our results in the previous sections, we 
would expect that acquirers did not experience superior long-term returns in the sixth merger 
cycle compared to the 1990s. Table 9 reports monthly estimates of calendar time abnormal 
returns to acquiring firms for a period of 36 months following the acquisition announcement. 
Abnormal returns are measured using average calendar time abnormal returns (ACTARs) and 
intercepts from calendar time portfolio regressions (CTPRs).
31
 The portfolio formation and 
regression processes are discussed in section 2.  
 
[Please Insert Table 9 About Here] 
 
                                               
30 In unreported results we have also compared (non-) large loss deals across different method of payments and 
a 21-day event horizon and results remain similar.  
31 Due to the fact that the 36-month holding period could be biased by events that are affected by the financial 
crisis we also performed tests using 12-month event window and results remain similar. In addition, we exclude 
acquirers that are involved in more than one acquisition during the event window (for both 36-month and 12-
month holding periods) and re-run the tests. The direction and significance of the results remain similar.  
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Based on ACTARs, acquirers in our sample experience negative abnormal returns of -
9.1% in the three-year period following the acquisition announcement. This result is driven 
by the stock and hybrid subsets. CTPR alphas are nonetheless statistically insignificant. In 
general, deals announced during the sixth merger wave resulted in negative abnormal returns 
to acquiring companies while estimates for the fifth merger wave are in all cases statistically 
insignificant. CTAR (CTPR) estimates for 2005-2006 correspond to a staggering -28% (-
23%) abnormal loss in the 36 months after the acquisition proposal. ACTAR differences 
between the two merger waves and their peaks are only statistically significant for the stock 
subset implying that acquirers that paid with stock during the sixth merger wave did worse.
32
 
Overall, acquisitions announced during the sixth merger cycle resulted in worse or at best 
similar performance for acquirers relative to the fifth merger cycle.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we present new evidence on mergers and acquisitions during the sixth 
merger cycle. The low financing rates and rich cash balances that resulted in liquidity awash, 
as well as the fact that acquirers were less overvalued relative to targets during this wave, led 
to more pronounced cash (and less equity) financing. The drivers of the sixth merger wave 
are therefore more consistent with neoclassical explanations of merger waves. In addition, the 
market for corporate control was less competitive, acquirers where less acquisitive and 
acquirer CEOs displayed less over-confidence about their ability to create superior value 
through M&As. As a result premiums paid during the sixth merger wave were significantly 
lower than in the past, implying more rational acquisition decisions. Nonetheless, acquirers 
still destroyed at least as much value for their shareholders as during the fifth merger wave. 
This can be attributed to the higher cash balances during the sixth merger cycle that may have 
                                               
32 We do not compute CTAR differences as these involve regressing monthly return differences on the four 
factors. However, there are no common months between the periods compared here.  
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exacerbated the free-cash flow problem and/or to the fact that investors were relatively less 
optimistic during this cycle compared to the 1990s.  
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Table 1. Sample Statistics 
The sample includes all U.S., completed, domestic, public mergers and acquisitions reported in Thomson Financial SDC 
between 1993 and 2007. Acquirers are listed on NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX and have data available on CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT. The acquirer owns less that 10% of the target‟s shares prior to the acquisition announcement and more than 
50% after the deal completion. The deal value is at least $1 million and the size of the target is at least 1% of the size of the 
acquirer. Statistics are reported for the entire sample and five other sub-periods. DEAL VALUE is the transaction value. 
ASIZE (TSIZE) is the market capitalization (in $ million) of the acquirer (target) one month prior the acquisition 
announcement. Values are in 2007 dollars. RSIZE is the target-to-bidder relative market value. Tobin‟s Q is the book value 
of assets minus the book value of common equity plus the market value of common equity over the book value of assets at 
the fiscal year end prior to the acquisition announcement year. RELQ is the acquirer‟s Tobin‟s Q over the target‟s Tobin‟s Q. 
ALL STOCK (ALL CASH) are transactions financed with pure stock (cash). STOCK (CASH) is the proportion of stock 
(cash) in the transaction. PREM is the offer price over the target‟s share price 4 weeks prior the acquisition announcement 
multiplied by 100 and is reported for observations between zero and 200. TCAR (-63,126) is the market adjusted target return 
for a period (-63,126) relative to the announcement day as in Schwert (2000). COMP is the share of listed firms (or the value 
of listed firms) on CRSP targeted in completed deals. SERIAL is the percentage of acquirers that make 2 or more public 
acquisitions during a 2-year period. HUBRIS is the percentage of acquiring firm managers that do not exercise vested stock 
options although they are 67% in-the-money. DIVERS is the share of transactions where the acquirer and target have 
different 2-digit SIC codes. INTEREST is the yearly average of the Wall Street Journal‟s prime rate and is based on corporate 
loans posted by at least 70% of the 10 largest U.S. banks. DEBTLOAD is the acquirers‟ long-term debt-to-assets ratio 
divided by the median long-term debt-to-assets ratio of the corresponding industry at the fiscal year end following the 
acquisition announcement year. CASH RES for the Market (Sample) is the yearly average of the sum of cash and short-term 
investments over the sum of total assets for all U.S. listed firms (acquirers in the sample). RUNUP is the buy-and-hold return 
of the S&P 500 Composite Index for a 6 month period ending one month preceding the acquisition announcement. 
Difference tests are based on a t-test for means and a Wilcoxon-test for medians. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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 All 1993-1999 1998-1999 2000-2002 2003-2007 2005-2006 
(5)-(2) (6)-(3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
No of Observations  3,206 1,905 679 579 722 293   
DEAL VALUE sum 5,336,112 2,769,996 1,728,726 1,238,646 1,327,470 721,621   
 mean 1,664 1,454 2,546 2,139 1,839 2,463 385 -83 
ASIZE mean 7,839 5,984 9,785 10,326 10,738 13,797 4,754
a 4,012b 
 median 1,283 1,213 1,788 1,163 1,716 1,902 502
a 114 
TSIZE mean 1,328 1,164 1,964 1,498 1,633 2,338 469
c 374c 
 median 194 169 227 150 308 416 139
a 189a 
RSIZE (%) mean 28.33 29.76 29.73 24.54 27.57 27.76 -2.20 -1.96 
 median 14.13 14.60 13.30 12.03 14.28 15.17 -0.32 1.88 
ACQQ mean 2.07 2.03 2.29 2.62 1.75 1.86 -0.28
a -0.43a 
 median 1.30 1.31 1.45 1.28 1.28 1.37 -0.02 -0.08
a 
TARQ mean 1.91 1.83 1.95 2.27 1.80 2.04 -0.03 0.09 
 median 1.27 1.27 1.33 1.20 1.35 1.46 0.08 0.13
c 
RELQ mean 1.27 1.27 1.34 1.50 1.11 1.07 -0.15
a -0.27a 
 median 1.06 1.06 1.12 1.12 1.02 1.01 -0.04
a -0.12a 
ALL STOCK (%) mean 47.88 58.06 55.67 43.35 24.65 23.21 -33.40
a -32.46a 
STOCK (%) mean 62.14 68.91 67.96 59.18 46.65 45.30 -22.26
a -22.67a 
ALL CASH (%) mean 21.24 16.75 14.87 21.07 33.24 33.79 16.50
a 18.91a 
CASH (%) mean 31.85 24.37 23.57 33.80 50.03 51.39 25.66
a 27.82a 
PREM (%) mean 44.43 44.96 48.33 51.51 37.85 36.17 -7.11
a -12.16a 
 median 36.37 37.73 42.17 43.71 30.17 30.20 -7.56
a -11.97a 
TCAR (-63,126) mean 27.06 25.73 28.00 37.06 22.75 21.30 -2.98
b -6.69a 
 median 23.90 22.31 24.78 35.05 20.67 18.94 -1.63
c -5.83b 
COMP - Activity (%) mean 4.16 4.09 5.89 4.19 3.42 3.59 - - 
               -  Value Acquired (%) mean 2.75 3.96 5.56 4.10 1.78 2.31 - - 
SERIAL (%) mean 38.24 42.78 41.97 35.92 28.12 27.30 -14.67
a -14.67a 
HUBRIS (%) mean 67.89 70.44 74.77 60.00 66.67 57.45 -3.78 -17.33
a 
DIVERS (%) mean 30.44 29.82 30.78 31.43 31.30 32.76 - - 
INTEREST (%) mean 7.10 7.84 8.18 6.95 6.14 7.07 - - 
DEBTLOAD mean 4.51 3.29 4.16 5.28 6.90 7.33 3.61
a 3.17a 
 median 1.32 1.25 1.35 1.33 1.58 1.67 0.33
a 0.32a 
CASH RES - Market (%) mean 8.95 8.05 8.42 9.02 10.16 10.33 - - 
- Sample (%)  mean 9.50 7.92 7.03 9.28 11.85 10.29 - - 
RUNUP (%) mean 5.58 8.72 8.79 -4.74 5.58 3.77 3.13
a 5.01a 
 median 6.32 8.86 9.11 -4.43 5.66 3.43 3.20
a 5.68a 
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Table 2. Acquisition Premiums by Sector 
The sample of acquisitions meets the criteria described in Table 1. Premium is the offer price over the target‟s share price 4 weeks prior the 
acquisition announcement multiplied by 100 and is reported for observations between zero and 200. Target sectors are based on the Fama 
and French 5 industry classification but results for financial firms (SIC 6000-6999) are reported separately. n is the sample size. Difference 
tests are based on a t-test for means and a Wilcoxon-test for medians. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
Industries  
All 1993-1999 1998-1999 2000-2002 2003-2007 2005-2006 
(5)-(2) (6)-(3) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
         
All 
  
mean 44.43 44.96 48.33 51.51 37.85 36.17 -7.11a -12.16a 
median 36.37 37.73 42.17 43.71 30.17 30.20 -7.56a -11.97a 
n 2,416 1,370 527 450 596 242  
 
      
   
 
Consumer mean 49.10 47.41 53.78 62.40 44.58 37.24 -2.82 -16.54
c 
median 37.77 38.78 44.58 50.47 31.01 31.31 -7.78 -13.27b 
n 234 153 54 35 46 17  
 
% 9.69 11.17 10.25 7.78 7.72 7.02  
 
      
   
 
Financials 
  
mean 38.17 38.54 38.17 42.70 34.17 32.90 -4.38b -5.28 
median 32.20 32.44 31.31 37.74 27.85 26.05 -4.59b -5.27c 
n 902 502 168 166 234 94  
 
% 37.33 36.64 31.88 36.89 39.26 38.84  
 
      
   
 
HiTec 
  
mean 52.27 52.97 57.90 63.72 42.17 37.21 -10.80a -20.69a 
median 45.00 49.16 56.40 54.58 33.93 32.56 -15.23a -23.85a 
n 564 286 131 121 157 64  
 
% 23.34 20.88 24.86 26.89 26.34 26.45  
 
      
   
 
Healthcare 
  
mean 45.06 49.21 57.44 41.58 38.99 45.72 -10.21a -11.73 
median 39.08 40.45 42.68 39.65 33.62 40.55 -6.83a -2.13 
n 224 127 34 24 73 31  
 
 % 9.27 9.27 6.45 5.33 12.25 12.81   
      
   
 
Manufacturing 
  
mean 40.95 41.93 47.05 47.59 27.91 26.61 -14.02a -20.44a 
median 34.99 35.69 39.85 41.33 23.91 27.39 -11.79a -12.47a 
n 300 185 85 67 48 24  
 
% 12.42 13.50 16.13 14.89 8.05 9.92  
 
      
   
 
Other mean 49.77 49.91 47.58 54.32 44.88 49.16 -5.03 1.59 
median 43.78 46.06 46.06 53.22 31.62 30.87 -14.45 -15.19 
n 192 117 55 37 38 12  
 
% 7.95 8.54 10.44 8.22 6.38 4.96  
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Table 3. Gains to Acquirers, Targets, and the Combined Firm 
The sample of acquisitions meets the criteria described in Table 1. Panel A, B, and C report acquirer, target, and combined firm cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) over a 3- and a 21-day announcement window.  Market model parameters are estimated over the period (-250, -15) 
relative to the announcement day. Combined returns are calculated using the market value-weighted average of the acquirer and target 
abnormal returns where market values are measured one month prior to the acquisition announcement. n is the sample size. Difference tests 
are based on a t-test for means and a Wilcoxon-test for medians. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Acquirer Returns        
 All 1993-1999 1998-1999 2000-2002 2003-2007 2005-2006 
(5)-(2) (6)-(3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CARs (-1,+1)          
All mean -1.50
a -1.17a -1.73a -2.36a -1.66a -1.73a -0.49c 0.00 
median -0.98a -0.81a -1.22a -1.69a -0.90a -1.03a -0.09c 0.19 
n 3,206 1,905 679 579 722 293   
Cash mean 0.68
a 1.04a 1.82a 1.12b -0.02 0.10 -1.06b -1.72b 
median 0.28c 0.49c 1.14b 0.51 -0.09 -0.09 -0.58b -1.24b 
n 681 319 101 122 240 99   
Stock mean -2.43
a -1.82a -2.61a -4.48a -3.34a -2.87a -1.52a -0.26 
median -1.63a -1.31a -2.19a -3.55a -2.28a -0.96b -0.97b 1.23 
n 1,535 1,106 378 251 178 68   
Hybrid mean -1.55
a -1.16a -1.85a -1.83a -1.98a -2.54a -0.82c -0.69 
median -1.27a -0.74a -1.20a -1.62a -1.53a -2.16a -0.79b -0.96 
n 990 480 200 206 304 126   
CARs (-10,+10)         
All 
mean -2.05a -2.10a -3.13a -2.07a -1.89a -1.91a 0.22 1.22c 
median -1.65a -1.74a -2.99a -1.32b -1.62a -1.96a 0.12 1.03 
n 3,206 1,905 679 579 722 293   
Cash 
mean 0.31 0.95 1.74c 0.99 -0.86 -0.36 -1.81b -2.10 
median 0.30 0.70 0.80 1.13 -0.47 -0.47 -1.17b -1.27c 
n 681 319 101 122 240 99   
Stock 
mean -2.78a -2.74a -4.41a -3.28a -2.35a -1.94 0.39 2.47b 
median -2.13a -2.24a -4.77a -2.09b -1.43b -1.14 0.81 3.63b 
n 1,535 1,106 378 251 178 68   
Hybrid 
mean -2.55a -2.65a -3.10a -2.50a -2.43a -3.11a 0.22 -0.01 
median -2.55a -2.41a -2.73a -2.13c -3.22a -3.39a -0.80 -0.67 
n 990 480 200 206 304 126   
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Panel B: Target Returns        
  
All 1993-1999 1998-1999 2000-2002 2003-2007 2005-2006 
(5)-(2) (6)-(3) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CARs (-1,+1)        
All mean 19.47
a 17.62a 18.50a 25.14a 20.01a 18.91a 2.39a 0.41 
median 16.23a 14.92a 15.47a 20.06a 16.67a 16.24a 1.75a 0.77 
n 2,509 1,503 549 436 570 224   
Cash mean 27.69
a 25.84a 27.47a 35.63a 26.79a 24.12a 0.94 -3.36 
median 23.00a 20.47a 21.17a 32.20a 21.95a 19.74a 1.48 -1.43 
n 541 258 81 83 200 83   
Stock mean 16.42
a 15.23a 16.78a 23.03a 14.58a 15.87a -0.66 -0.92 
median 13.39a 12.97a 14.33a 18.79a 12.02a 15.60a -0.95 1.27 
n 1,192 859 300 193 140 49   
Hybrid mean 18.43
a 17.43a 17.24a 22.24a 17.43a 15.84a 0.00 -1.41 
median 14.88a 14.86a 14.80a 16.09a 14.87a 14.02a 0.01 -0.78 
n 776 386 168 160 230 92   
CARs (-10,+10)         
All mean 23.31
a 22.10a 24.37a 29.36a 21.84a 21.35a -0.25 -3.03c 
median 20.27a 19.80a 21.79a 25.91a 18.77a 17.71a -1.04 -4.08 
n 2,509 1,501 544 439 569 225   
Cash mean 31.12
a 30.00a 34.40a 41.64a 28.10a 25.62a -1.90 -8.78b 
median 26.95a 26.83a 28.00a 39.32a 23.66a 20.75a -3.17 -7.25b 
n 544 260 81 85 199 83   
Stock mean 20.51
a 19.44a 21.96a 28.51a 16.13a 16.97a -3.30c -4.99 
median 18.04a 17.45a 20.80a 25.91a 14.57a 13.87a -2.88c -6.94 
n 1,188 857 296 191 140 50   
Hybrid mean 22.13
a 22.69a 23.78a 23.95a 19.91a 19.87a -2.78c -3.91 
median 18.81a 20.52a 20.65a 18.77a 17.62a 16.67a -2.91 -3.98 
n 777 384 167 163 230 92   
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Panel C: Combined Returns        
  
All 1993-1999 1998-1999 2000-2002 2003-2007 2005-2006 
(5)-(2) (6)-(3) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
CARs (-1,+1)        
All mean 1.12
a 1.30a 0.91a 0.52c 1.09a 1.15a -0.21 0.24 
median 0.74a 0.85a 0.35 0.36 0.64a 0.67c -0.21 0.31 
n 2,509 1,498 545 442 569 222   
Cash mean 2.58
a 2.88a 3.02a 3.31a 1.87a 1.82a -1.00b -1.20 
median 1.71a 1.99a 2.44a 2.78a 1.19a 0.91b -0.80b -1.53 
n 551 259 82 90 202 83   
Stock mean 0.12 0.40
b -0.03 -0.94b -0.17 0.42 -0.57 0.45 
median -0.04 0.09 -0.48 -0.52c -0.52 0.28 -0.60 0.76 
n 1,186 856 296 192 138 47   
Hybrid mean 1.60
a 2.24a 1.53a 0.71 1.17a 0.90c -1.07b -0.63 
median 0.89a 1.49a 0.51c 0.07 0.54 0.42 -0.95b -0.09 
n 772 383 167 160 229 92   
CARs (-10,+10)         
All mean 1.12
a 1.05a 0.30 1.10c 1.31a 1.23b 0.26 0.93 
median 0.79a 0.56b 0.17 1.69a 0.57a 0.33 0.01 0.17 
n 2,509 1,503 546 436 570 225   
Cash mean 2.85
a 3.72a 3.92a 3.82a 1.29b 0.92 -2.43a -3.00b 
median 2.59a 3.30a 3.55a 4.30a 1.22b 1.04 -2.08a -2.51b 
n 553 261 82 90 202 83   
Stock mean -0.18 -0.29 -1.46
b -0.54 0.97 1.31 1.25 2.76 
median -0.36 -0.43 -1.32b 0.00 -0.15 1.06 0.28 2.38c 
n 1,181 858 298 185 138 50   
Hybrid mean 1.85
a 2.21a 1.66c 1.46 1.53a 1.48c -0.68 -0.19 
median 1.36a 1.67a 0.95 2.96b 0.52 -0.42 -1.15 -1.37 
n 775 384 166 161 230 92   
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Table 4. Winners and Losers 
The sample of acquisitions meets the criteria described in Table 1. The table reports the percentage share of winners and losers as well as moderate and extreme winners and losers around the acquisition 
announcement. Winners (Losers) are acquirers subject to positive (negative) abnormal returns. Extreme winners (losers) are acquirers that experience abnormal returns above (below) the median value of the positive 
(negative) return sub-set of the full sample. Difference tests are based on a t-test for means and a Wilcoxon-test for medians. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
  
  
All 1993-1999 1998-1999 2003-2007 2005-2006 
(4)-(2) (5)-(3)   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
All Moder Extr All Moder Extr All Moder Extr All Moder Extr All Moder Extr All Moder Extr All Moder Extr 
Winners 
CAR>0 
  
  [0, 2.6]  >2.6   [0, 2.6] >2.6   [0, 2.6] >2.6   [0, 2.6] >2.6   [0, 2.6] >2.6   [0, 2.6] >2.6   [0, 2.6] >2.6 
All 39.8 50.0 50.0 42.0 50.3 49.7 38.6 42.0 58.0 36.8 58.6 41.4 34.8 57.8 42.2 -5.2b 8.3b -8.3b -3.8 15.8a -15.8a 
Cash 53.3 50.1 49.9 55.8 48.9 51.1 62.4 42.9 57.1 48.3 59.5 40.5 47.5 57.5 42.5 -7.5c 10.6c -10.6c -14.9b 14.6 -14.6 
Stock 34.9 51.6 48.4 37.4 52.4 47.6 31.8 42.5 57.5 30.9 63.6 36.4 36.8 56.0 44.0 -6.5c 11.2 -11.2 5.0 13.5 -13.5 
Hybrid 38.3 47.8 52.2 43.3 47.1 52.9 39.5 40.5 59.5 31.2 54.8 45.2 23.8 60.0 40.0 -12.0a 7.7 -7.7 -15.7a 19.5c -19.5c 
Losers     
CAR<0 
    [-3.6, 0) <-3.6   [-3.6, 0) <-3.6   [-3.6, 0) <-3.6   [-3.6, 0) <-3.6   [-3.6, 0) <-3.6   [-3.6, 0) <-3.6   [-3.6, 0) <-3.6 
All 60.2 50.0 50.0 58.0 50.2 49.8 61.4 43.7 56.3 63.2 55.7 44.3 65.2 57.1 42.9 5.2b 5.5b -5.5b 3.8 13.4a -13.4a 
Cash 46.7 69.5 30.5 44.2 70.9 29.1 37.6 65.8 34.2 51.7 71.0 29.0 52.5 75.0 25.0 7.5c 0.1 -0.1 14.9b 9.2 -9.2 
Stock 65.1 44.3 55.7 62.6 47.4 52.6 68.2 41.1 58.9 69.1 42.3 57.7 63.2 34.8 65.2 6.5c -5.1 5.1 -5.0 -6.3 6.3 
Hybrid 61.7 49.3 50.7 56.7 46.7 53.3 60.5 42.2 57.8 68.8 55.5 44.5 76.2 57.3 42.7 12.0a 8.8c -8.8c 15.7a 15.1b -15.1b 
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Table 5. Regressions of Acquisition Premiums 
The sample of acquisitions meets the criteria described in Table 1. The dependent variable is the offer premium; offer price 
over the target‟s share price 4 weeks prior the acquisition announcement. Premium observations between zero and two are 
excluded. Regressions are performed for i) the entire sample (specifications 1-2), ii) for 1993-1999 and 2003-2007 
observations only (specifications 3-4), and iii) for 1998-1999 and 2005-2006 observations only (specifications 5-6). 2003-
2007 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for acquisitions announced between 2003 and 2007, and zero otherwise.  
2005-2006 is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for acquisitions announced between 2005 and 2006, and zero 
otherwise. BID is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the target firm received at least one additional bid from a third party when 
the initial bid was still under consideration, and zero otherwise. TEND is a dummy equal to 1 if a tender offer was made  to 
target shareholders and zero otherwise. SERIAL is a dummy equal to 1 if the acquiring firm has made 2 or more acquisitions 
within 2 consecutive years, and zero otherwise. HOST is a dummy equal to 1 if the acquirer makes an offer to target 
shareholders bypassing target management and zero otherwise. INTER is a dummy equal to 1 if the acquiring and the target 
firms have a different 2-digit SIC code, and zero otherwise. FIN is a dummy equal to 1 if the target is a financial firm with 
SIC code between 6000-6999, and zero otherwise. TECH is a dummy equal to 1 if the target firm is in a high-tech industry, 
and zero otherwise. RUNUP is the buy-and-hold return of the S&P 500 Composite Index for a 6 month period ending one 
month preceding the acquisition announcement. STOCK is a dummy variable if the transaction was financed 100% with 
stock. ASIZE (TSIZE) is the natural logarithm of the acquirer‟s (target‟s) market capitalization one month prior to the 
acquisition announcement. RELQ is the acquirer‟s Tobin‟s Q over target‟s Tobin‟s Q. Tobin‟s Q is defined as the book value 
of assets plus market value of equity minus the book value of equity over the book value of assets at the fiscal year end prior 
to the announcement year. N is the number of observations in each regression and Adj. R2 is the adjusted R-squared. p-values 
are reported below regression estimates. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.    
 
All 1993-1999 & 2003-2007 1998-1999 & 2005-2006 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.5660
a 0.5368a 0.5681a 0.5357a 0.6079a 0.6488a 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
      
2003-2007  -0.0892
a -0.0887a -0.0850a -0.0873a 
  
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  
2005-2006     
-0.1052a -0.1264a 
 
    
0.000 0.000 
 
      
BID 0.1373
a 0.1128a 0.1611a 0.1304a 0.0689 0.0761 
 
0.000 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.242 0.235 
TEND 0.0292 0.0340 0.0296 0.0139 0.0259 0.0528 
 
0.143 0.164 0.173 0.620 0.470 0.254 
SERIAL 0.0224 0.0284
c 0.0185 0.0266 0.0259 0.0539c 
 
0.112 0.083 0.221 0.132 0.296 0.055 
HOST 0.1728
a 0.2000a 0.1797a 0.2254a 0.0656 0.0496 
 
0.002 0.001 0.004 0.001 0.563 0.672 
INTER 0.0191 0.0249 0.0216 0.0168 0.0200 0.0206 
 
0.166 0.124 0.139 0.332 0.401 0.445 
FIN  -0.1034
a -0.0899a -0.0956a -0.0924a -0.1465a -0.1278a 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TECH 0.0559
a 0.0421b 0.0437b 0.0335c 0.0288 0.0509 
 
0.001 0.026 0.012 0.098 0.293 0.107 
RUNUP -0.1673
b -0.1106 -0.1448 -0.1480 -0.0742 -0.1728 
 
0.018 0.179 0.142 0.217 0.630 0.357 
STOCK 0.0088 0.0059 0.0003 -0.0015 0.0377 0.0317 
 
0.534 0.721 0.984 0.934 0.140 0.268 
ASIZE 0.0360
a 0.0345a 0.0327a 0.0331a 0.0353a 0.0292a 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 
TSIZE -0.0695
a -0.0692a -0.0659a -0.0658a -0.0715a -0.0714a 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RELQ  
0.0294a 
 
0.0310a 
 
0.0088 
 
 
0.002 
 
0.007 
 
0.572 
 
      
N 2,264 1,479 1,855 1,164 720 494 
Adj. R
2 
(%) 14.00 17.10 13.10 15.88 16.24 19.55 
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Table 6. Regressions of Acquirer Returns 
The dependent variable is the 3-day acquirer cumulative abnormal return (CAR) where market model parameters are 
estimated over the period (-250, -15) relative to the announcement day. The sample meets the criteria described in Table 1. 
Regressions are performed for i) the entire sample (specifications 1-2), ii) for 1993-1999 and 2003-2007 observations only 
(specifications 3-4), and iii) for 1998-1999 and 2005-2006 observations only (specifications 5-6). 2003-2007 is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 for acquisitions announced between 2003 and 2007, and zero otherwise. 2005-2006 is a 
binary variable that takes the value of 1 for acquisitions announced between 2005 and 2006, and zero otherwise. RSIZE is the 
natural logarithm of the market value of the target over the market value of the acquirer, measured one month prior to the 
acquisition announcement. PREM is the offer price over the target‟s share price 4 weeks prior the acquisition announcement 
multiplied by 100 and is reported for observations between zero and 200. The remaining variables are defined in Table 5. N 
is the number of observations in each regression and Adj. R2 is the adjusted R-squared. p-values are reported below 
regression estimates. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.    
 
 
All 1993-1999 & 2003-2007 1998-1999 & 2005-2006 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.0067 0.0098 0.0022 0.0017 -0.0033 -0.0141 
 
0.173 0.287 0.685 0.875 0.732 0.419 
 
      
2003-2007  -0.0045 -0.0038 -0.0064
b -0.0060 
  
 
0.115 0.297 0.028 0.142 
  
2005-2006 
    
-0.0013 0.0048 
 
    
0.802 0.497 
 
      
BID -0.0115
c -0.0065 -0.0031 -0.0049 -0.0002 -0.0006 
 
0.083 0.441 0.667 0.611 0.987 0.966 
TEND 0.0202
a 0.0143a 0.0197a 0.0157b 0.0189b 0.0315a 
 
0.000 0.008 0.000 0.014 0.011 0.004 
SERIAL 0.0029 -0.0041 0.0032 -0.0038 0.0080
c 0.0039 
 
0.254 0.256 0.234 0.348 0.098 0.547 
HOST 0.0008 0.0197 0.0002 0.0183 -0.0141 0.0056 
 
0.942 0.125 0.984 0.215 0.583 0.839 
INTER 0.0040 0.0035 0.0033 0.0054 0.0051 0.0049 
 
0.103 0.317 0.209 0.172 0.266 0.436 
FIN  0.0032 -0.0022 0.0015 -0.0038 -0.0019 -0.0083 
 
0.247 0.595 0.615 0.396 0.715 0.266 
TECH -0.0169
a -0.0151a -0.0155a -0.0157a -0.0118b -0.0094 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.033 0.201 
RUNUP 0.0234
c 0.0566a 0.0080 0.0284 0.0065 0.0391 
 
0.061 0.002 0.646 0.296 0.827 0.372 
STOCK -0.0165
a -0.0179a -0.0130a -0.0151a -0.0143a -0.0090 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.179 
ASIZE -0.0022
a -0.0036a -0.0013b -0.0020c -0.0014 -0.0020 
 
0.000 0.001 0.045 0.096 0.217 0.285 
RSIZE  
-0.0119a 
 
-0.0097a 
 
-0.0097a 
 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
PREM  
-0.0283a 
 
-0.0266a 
 
-0.0293a 
 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.006 
RELQ  
-0.0055a 
 
-0.0036 
 
-0.0019 
 
 
0.008 
 
0.172 
 
0.604 
 
      
N 3,206 1,479 2,627 1,164 972 494 
Adj. R
2 
(%) 4.69 9.36 3.64 6.94 2.42 5.56 
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Table 7. Regressions of Combined Returns 
The dependent variable is the 3-day combined acquirer and target cumulative abnormal return (CAR) where market model 
parameters are estimated over the period (-250, -15) relative to the announcement day. Combined returns are calculated using 
the market value-weighted average of the acquirer and target abnormal returns where market values are measured one month 
prior to the acquisition announcement. The sample meets the criteria described in Table 1 and the target firm is listed on 
CRSP and COMPUSTAT. Regressions are performed for i) the entire sample (specifications 1-2), ii) for 1993-1999 and 
2003-2007 observations only (specifications 3-4), and iii) for 1998-1999 and 2005-2006 observations only (specifications 5-
6). 2003-2007 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for acquisitions announced between 2003 and 2007, and zero 
otherwise. 2005-2006 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for acquisitions announced between 2005 and 2006, and 
zero otherwise. RSIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of the target over the market value of the acquirer, 
measured one month prior to the acquisition announcement. PREM is the offer price over the target‟s share price 4 weeks 
prior the acquisition announcement multiplied by 100 and is reported for observations between zero and 200. The remaining 
variables are defined in Table 5. N is the number of observations in each regression and Adj. R2 is the adjusted R-squared. p-
values are reported below regression estimates. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.    
 
All 1993-1999 & 2003-2007 1998-1999 & 2005-2006 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.0337
a 0.0327a 0.0377a 0.0333a 0.0284a 0.0189b 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.038 
 
      
2003-2007  -0.0038 0.0006 -0.0053
c 0.0001 
  
 
0.170 0.859 0.067 0.986 
  
2005-2006     
0.0006 0.0083 
 
    
0.913 0.181 
 
      
BID -0.0075 -0.0150
b -0.0022 -0.0135 0.0035 -0.0097 
 
0.220 0.047 0.747 0.116 0.767 0.450 
TEND 0.0190
a 0.0163a 0.0188a 0.0140b 0.0197a 0.0249a 
 
0.000 0.001 0.000 0.014 0.006 0.009 
SERIAL -0.0042
c -0.0074b -0.0018 -0.0058c 0.0025 0.0014 
 
0.086 0.020 0.490 0.100 0.596 0.806 
HOST 0.0141 0.0177 0.0111 0.0157 -0.0091 0.0052 
 
0.174 0.130 0.329 0.242 0.688 0.825 
INTER 0.0044
c 0.0039 0.0061b 0.0054 0.0082c 0.0080 
 
0.075 0.218 0.020 0.124 0.076 0.149 
FIN -0.0026 -0.0018 -0.0063
b -0.0062 -0.0113b -0.0132b 
 
0.352 0.617 0.032 0.122 0.037 0.041 
TECH -0.0134
a -0.0144a -0.0150a -0.0170a -0.0152a -0.0139b 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.031 
RUNUP 0.0068 0.0180 -0.0148 0.0021 -0.0146 0.0317 
 
0.591 0.268 0.399 0.932 0.626 0.414 
STOCK -0.0152
a -0.0164a -0.0138a -0.0140a -0.0099b -0.0075 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.200 
RSIZE 0.0062
a 0.0069a 0.0068a 0.0074a 0.0056a 0.0060a 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
PREM  
0.0155a 
 
0.0191a 
 
0.0142 
 
 
0.002 
 
0.001 
 
0.118 
RELQ  
-0.0040b 
 
-0.0026 
 
-0.0031 
 
 
0.033 
 
0.258 
 
0.325 
 
      
N 2,509 1,456 2,067 1,146 767 482 
Adj. R
2 
(%) 7.22 8.24 8.16 8.31 5.07 5.56 
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Table 8. Large Loss Deals 
The sample of acquisitions meets the criteria described in Table 1. Panel A reports the characteristics for acquiring firms that created large loss deals. 
Large loss deals are transactions that resulted in more than one billion dollar loss in the acquiring firms‟ market value during the (-1,+1) 
announcementwindow. Panel B excludes large loss deals. ASIZE is the market capitalization (in $ million) of the acquirer one month prior the 
acquisition announcement. Values are in 2007 dollars. ACARs are the acquirer‟s cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over a 3-day announcement 
window. Market model parameters are estimated over the period (-250, -15) relative to the announcement day. Difference tests are based on a t-test 
for means and a Wilcoxon-test for medians. a, b, and c denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
     
 
 All 1993-1999 1998-1999 2000-2002 2003-2007 2005-2006 
(5)-(2) (6)-(3) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A: Large Loss Deals          
No of Observations  153 68 46 49 36 19   
% compared to Total Deals  4.77 3.57 6.77 8.46 4.99 6.48   
Dollar Gain/Loss sum -613,136 -208,106 -155,634 -283,962 -121,068 -70,112   
 mean -4,007 -3,060 -3,383 -5,795 -3,363 -3,690 303 307 
ASIZE mean 61,953 46,558 49,078 78,353 68,711 73,897 22,152
c 24,818 
 median 33,299 29,331 25,619 31,396 41,473 70,603 12,142 44,984
b 
ACARs mean -8.59 -8.87 -9.62 -10.23 -5.82 -5.56 3.04
a 4.06a 
 median -7.03 -8.16 -8.96 -8.52 -4.97 -4.94 3.19
a 4.02a 
Panel B: Non-Large Loss Deals         
No of Observations  3,053 1,837 633 530 686 274   
% compared to Total Deals  95.23. 96.43 93.23 91.54 95.01 93.52   
Dollar Gain/Loss sum 58,182 40,554 39,706 11,298 6,329 7,060   
 mean 19.06 22.08 62.73 21.32 9.22 25.77 12.85 -36.96 
ASIZE mean 5,127 4,482 6,930 4,037 7,696 9,630 3,214
a 2,700c 
 median 1,162 1,092 1,522 886 1,532 1,279 440
a -243c 
ACARs mean -1.14 -0.89 -1.16 -1.63 -1.45 -1.46 -0.56
b -0.31 
 median -0.76 -0.65 -0.81 -1.29 -0.77 -0.80 -0.12
c 0.02 
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Table 9. Acquirer Long-Run Returns 
The table reports monthly calendar time acquirer abnormal returns. The sample meets the criteria described in Table 1. Acquirers 
enter the portfolio on the announcement month of each transaction and remain for 36 months. Abnormal returns are calculated 
using i) calendar time abnormal returns (CTARs) and ii) calendar time portfolio regressions (CTPRs). ACTARs acquirer 
abnormal returns are calculated as CTARi,t = Ri,t – RSize/BM benchmark,t.  where Ri,t is the return of acquirer i at month t and  RSize/BM 
benchmark,t  is the return of the corresponding 25 size and book-to-market reference portfolio for the same month as in Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000). The ACTAR is then given by the universal average of all mean monthly abnormal return observations. CTPR 
intercepts are from a time-series regression of the following form:   Rpt – Rft = p + bp (Rmt - Rft) + sp SMBt + hp HMLt + up UMDt 
+ pt, where Rpt – Rft , is the equally-weighted, monthly calendar time portfolio excess return and the independent variables are 
the Fama/French (1993) and Carhart (1997) factors. ACTAR difference tests are based on a t-test for means and a Wilcoxon-test 
for medians. p-values are reported in brackets below abnormal return estimates. a,b, and c denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level. Cal is the number of calendar months and n is the number of observations. Calendar months with less 
than 10 return observations are excluded from regressions.  
 
  
All 1993-1999 1998-1999 2000-2002 2003-2007 2005-2006 
(5)-(2) (6)-(3) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All ACTAR -0.252
a -0.126 -0.208 -0.303c -0.385b -0.801a -0.259 -0.593 
 p-value [0.005] [0.402] [0.413] [0.057] [0.012] [0.003] [0.223] [0.102] 
 Cal 204 119 59 71 84 59   
 CTPRa -0.039 0.126 0.352 0.107 -0.257
c -0.647a   
 p-value [0.714] [0.458] [0.220] [0.601] [0.051] [0.004]   
 Mkt-Rf 0.981
a 1.085a 1.100a 1.055a 0.906a 0.867a   
 p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   
 SMB 0.405
a 0.420a 0.411a 0.545a 0.649a 0.611a   
 p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   
 HML 0.279
a 0.434a 0.435a 0.171a 0.131b 0.187b   
 p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.005] [0.023] [0.033]   
 UMD -0.231
a -0.289a -0.294a -0.215a -0.215a -0.254a   
 p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   
 Cal  203 118 59 71 83 58   
 n 3,170 1,885 665 571 714 290   
Cash ACTAR -0.035 -0.152 -0.398 0.420 -0.163 -0.282 -0.011 0.116 
 p-value [0.783] [0.510] [0.359] [0.194] [0.396] [0.223] [0.971] [0.813] 
 Cal 204 119 59 71 84 59   
 CTPRa 0.264
c 0.266 0.228 0.902a -0.041 -0.264   
 p-value [0.065] [0.210] [0.552] [0.008] [0.792] [0.270]   
 Mkt-Rf 0.899
a 0.971a 0.969a 0.738a 0.936a 0.900a   
 p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   
 SMB 0.367
a 0.406a 0.470a 0.556a 0.640a 0.578a   
 p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   
 HML 0.353
a 0.560a 0.646a 0.321a -0.084 -0.052   
 p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.212] [0.589]   
 UMD -0.171
a -0.178a -0.207a -0.213a -0.161a -0.166a   
 p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]   
 Cal  195 113 55 67 81 54   
 n 672 317 99 117 238 99   
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Stock ACTAR -0.391
b 0.107 0.031 -0.677b -0.781b -1.102b -0.888b -1.133c 
 p-value [0.012] [0.619] [0.937] [0.041] [0.013] [0.021] [0.019] [0.064] 
 Cal 204 119 59 71 84 59   
 CTPRa -0.210 0.342 0.606 -0.158 -0.651
b -1.204b   
 p-value [0.209] [0.125] [0.151] [0.618] [0.032] [0.012]   
 Mkt-Rf 0.992
a 1.119a 1.130a 1.213a 0.859a 0.810a   
 p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   
 SMB 0.402
a 0.432a 0.425a 0.700a 0.687a 0.458b   
 p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.046]   
 HML 0.140
a 0.348a 0.298b -0.148 0.180 0.285   
 p-value [0.009] [0.000] [0.013] [0.108] [0.164] [0.133]   
 UMD -0.228
a -0.334a -0.334a -0.258a -0.132b -0.109   
 p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.031] [0.217]   
 Cal  202 117 59 68 81 54   
 n 1,525 1,102 376 248 175 67   
Hybrid ACTAR -0.441
a -0.651a -0.824a -0.209 -0.397c -0.993b 0.254 -0.169 
 p-value [0.001] [0.001] [0.009] [0.510] [0.057] [0.013] [0.372] [0.732] 
 Cal 204 119 59 71 84 59   
 CTPRa -0.160 -0.315 -0.252 0.190 -0.322
c -0.479c   
 p-value [0.187] [0.110] [0.457] [0.381] [0.056] [0.087]   
 Mkt-Rf 0.973
a 1.096a 1.134a 1.024a 0.888a 0.867a   
 p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   
 SMB 0.417
a 0.392a 0.348a 0.365a 0.601a 0.614a   
 p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   
 HML 0.489
a 0.566a 0.596a 0.635a 0.341a 0.312a   
 p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.007]   
 UMD -0.231
a -0.244a -0.250a -0.173a -0.291a -0.431a   
 p-value [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   
 Cal  199 112 57 68 81 56   
 n 973 471 197 201 301 124   
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Figure 1. Acquisition Activity Through Time 
The figure shows the total value (in $ billions) spent between 1993 and 2007 in U.S., completed, domestic acquisitions as reported in Thomson 
Financial SDC. Values are expressed in 2007 dollars. “All deals” include all reported corporate control transactions. Transactions labeled as 
spinoffs, recapitalizations, self-tenders, exchange offers, repurchases, and privatizations are excluded. 
 
 
  
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
To
ta
l D
e
al
 V
al
u
e
 (
$b
il)
  
Year
All Deals
42 
 
Figure 2. Acquisition Premiums Through Time  
Average premium paid in domestic, public acquisitions between 1993 and 2007. The sample of acquisitions meets the criteria described in Table 
1. Premium is the offer price over the target‟s share price 4 weeks prior the acquisition announcement multiplied by 100 and is reported for 
observations between zero and 200. Target Return (-63,126) is the market adjusted target return for a period (-63,126) around the announcement 
day. 
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